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Abstract
When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an important instrument
in the development of an optimal R&D policy. The regulator, however, is unlikely
to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to
which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable
that is private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopoly setting we
analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policy where the government can
either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sum subsidies to the parties involved. The
second-best R&D policy without subsidies will either block some welfare
improving RJVs or allow some welfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies,
the second-best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare
decreasing RJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.
Keywords: Research joint ventures; R&D policy; Asymmetric information;
Revelation mechanism
JEL classification: L13, L50, D82, O323
1. Introduction
Two features distinguish R&D from ordinary capital investments. First, R&D is
a public good (Arrow (1962), Grossman and Shapiro (1986)). The use by one firm of
the information produced by its R&D investments does not diminish the amount of
information available to other firms. The optimal economy wide allocation would
therefore involve the free distribution of this information. Second, R&D investment is
plagued by an externality problem. Firms investing in R&D typically can not fully
appropriate the results from their own R&D investments. This tends to reduce the
incentive to invest in R&D when firms act non-cooperatively (Spence (1984),
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), Kamien, Muller
and Zang (1992)).
1 In this paper we concentrate on two policy options that have been
proposed to reduce these market failures: internalization of the externality and subsidies
(Katz and Ordover (1990)). One way to avoid the appropriability problem is to
internalize the spillovers by forming Research Joint Ventures (RJV). In a RJV the firms
internalize the positive effect these spillovers have on the R&D and profits of their
partners by deciding jointly on their R&D investments, taking their spillovers into
account. Subsidies provide an additional R&D policy instrument to improve the
allocation of resources to R&D investments (Brodley (1990), Jacquemin (1988)).
Subsidies can be lump-sum transfers which implement the R&D policy or per unit
R&D subsidies which change the marginal incentive to invest in R&D. In this paper we
only consider lump-sum subsidies that implement the R&D policy. A subsidy per unit
of R&D creates additional incentive problems in reporting the true level of R&D
investments and would complicate the analysis considerably.
2
                                                       
1 However, see Levin and Reiss (1988), Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Papaconstantinou (1990) for a
different result.
2 Brown (1984) noted a significant increase in R&D expenditures reported on tax forms in response to
the tax credit for increases in R&D spending of the 1981 Economic Recovery Act. The increase greatly
exceeded the growth in spending reported in Business Week's survey of R&D expenditures. This
divergence between growth rates is consistent with the existence of an informational problem in
reporting the true level of R&D expenditures.4
When firms are allowed to form RJVs, R&D investments increase with the
level of spillovers, exceeding the non-cooperative investment level when the spillovers
are substantial (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), De Bondt and Veugelers (1991)).
Firms that cooperate in R&D might thus not only increase profits but also welfare when
the spillovers are substantial. Policywise, a case can then be made for allowing RJVs to
form when there are high spillovers in R&D. However, when there are low or no
spillovers, firms acting non-cooperatively with respect to R&D bring about higher
welfare than when allowed to form a RJV. The only effect of a RJV in this case is to
reduce R&D competition, which in turn decreases welfare (Katz (1986)).
3 This
theoretical finding has fueled the debate on the issue of relaxing antitrust regulation
with respect to RJVs. Everybody agrees on the benefits due to internalizing the
externality by means of a RJV when the information leakage is substantial (Jacquemin
and Soete (1994)). However, the debate on the exact implementation of this policy is
still ongoing. In evaluating cooperative R&D regulators often use the same “rule of
reason” as in the case of mergers. Given the dynamic nature of R&D, insensitive
application of these static merger guidelines may lead to undesirable outcomes
(Ordover and Willig (1985)). Appropriate standards for evaluating RJVs should be
developed. Jorde and Teece (1990) propose the creation of an administrative procedure
for evaluating and possibly certifying cooperative R&D agreements in order to establish
a safe harbor from antitrust litigation. Shapiro and Willig (1990) claim that this would
amount to giving RJVs a blank check. They argue that a regulator needs a great deal of
information to evaluate a RJV and much of this information might be proprietary.
Similarly, Geroski (1992) states that since there is no presumption that the benefits of
RJVs will be large or easily realized in every case, the design of the policy is likely to be
                                                       
3 It has often been suggested that RJVs might also facilitate collusion in the output market. We do not
exclude the possibility that firms in a RJV behave more cooperatively in the output market. A necessary
condition for a RJV to be welfare improving in this case is that total R&D investments increase. See Yi
(1995) for an analysis of the welfare effects of product market collusion by an industrywide RJV. We
abstract from any dynamic considerations in this paper. See Martin (1993) for an analysis of the
increased potential for tacit collusion in RJVs. For an analysis of the effects of collusion in the output
market on RJV formation, see Greenlee and Cassiman (1996).5
critical. In fact, as we will argue in this paper, the spillover level of individual firms may
be private information of the firms within the industry and this will influence the design
of the optimal R&D policy.
Both the formation of RJVs and the public funding of R&D projects have
increased in recent years (Jacquemin and Soete (1994)). The most systematic evidence
on the formation of RJVs are the registrations of RJVs in the USA under the National
Cooperative Research Act (NCRA). By registering under the NCRA, firms become
exempt from treble damages under antitrust regulation. However, cooperative R&D
ventures need not register under the NCRA. In that case they are liable under the usual
antitrust regulation. Since the passage of the NCRA in 1984 until 1994, 453 new RJVs
have filled in the United States.
4 From these registrations it seems that collaborative
research is a more dominant form of an innovation-related strategy among firms within
the manufacturing sector (Link (1996)). The issue we are concerned about in this paper
is that maybe too many RJVs form unchallenged and that asymmetric information
between the regulator and the industry biases the type of RJVs that actually register.
Scott (1988) notes that evidence on the effect of the NCRA suggests that cooperative
research registered under the NCRA does not happen in industries with severe
appropriability problems. According to the theory, RJVs formed by these firms would
then most likely decrease welfare. Firms that form RJVs and do not register under the
NCRA, consider antitrust charges extremely unlikely because their cooperative
agreements do not conflict with regulatory objectives and at the same time they avoid
publicizing their cooperative ventures. In Europe the 1986 Single European Act
amendments to the Treaty of Rome gave the Community specific responsibility for
strengthening “the scientific and technological basis of European industry.” In addition
                                                       
4 An RJV, as defined in the NCRA, is “any group of activities, including attempting to make, making
or performing a contract by two or more persons for the purpose of (A) theoretical analysis,
experimentation, or systematic study of phenomena or observable facts, (B) the development or testing
of basic engineering techniques, (C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of scientific or
technical nature into practical application for experimental and demonstration purposes..., (D) the
collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or (E) any combination of the [above] (Link
(1996)).6
to the EEC block exemption of Article 85(1) of the EC treaty for cooperative ventures
in R&D, a variety of programs were initiated, many of which explicitly fostered inter-
firm cooperation tied to Community funding for part of the R&D costs of the proposed
projects (Geroski (1992), Martin (1996)). There is less systematic evidence on
cooperative ventures in Europe, but the available evidence suggests that the number of
RJVs has been rapidly increasing (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1992), Jacquemin and
Soete (1994), Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992)). The EC budget for funding
cooperative R&D projects has also been steadily increasing over the years (Peterson
(1991)). 
In our model the government
5 has two R&D policy instruments at its disposal.
First the government can allow or prohibit the formation of a RJV. We assume that
firms cannot be forced into a RJV against their will, so that RJVs form only when
profitable. The regulatory policy analyzed here consists of an evaluation process which
allows RJVs to form with a certain probability depending on the reported
appropriability problems. The second policy instrument is subsidizing R&D where
subsidies are assumed to be lump-sum transfers. The regulator chooses its policy in
order to maximize social welfare taking into account its information disadvantage
regarding the true level of R&D spillovers. This is an implementation problem with
asymmetric information between a regulator and an oligopoly.
6 The resulting policy can
be formulated as follows: firms wishing to engage in cooperative research apply to the
government for permission. Firms simultaneously and independently report their own
spillover level to the government. The probability that a RJV will be approved and the
level of lump-sum subsidies are a function of these reports. The first-best policy always
allows a RJV when at least one firm has high spillovers. However, given asymmetric
information the first-best policy can not be implemented. The second-best R&D policy
is industry specific and depends on the beliefs of the regulator about the spillover
                                                       
5 We will use government and regulator interchangeably throughout this paper.7
situation of the industry. The regulator will either allow some welfare reducing RJVs or
block some welfare enhancing RJVs. Firms within industries that are typically
characterized by high spillovers will always be allowed to form RJVs. When low
spillovers are most likely, no RJVs are allowed to form. In intermediate cases the
second-best R&D policy improves upon this unsophisticated R&D policy by setting up
a policy that screens for the different spillover states of the industry. In order to induce
truthful revelation in this case, the second-best policy deviates from the first-best by
either allowing RJVs to form with some probability when spillovers are low or
restricting the formation of RJVs when spillovers are high. The lump-sum subsidies
improve this screening capability of the regulator. The second-best policy developed in
this paper differs from the existing R&D policies in the USA and Europe by
conditioning the R&D policy on industry (or firm) specific information. It is important
to screen for undesirable RJVs when the appropriability conditions of the industry are
not clear to the regulator. In particular, if we believe that it is easy to exaggerate the
existence of spillovers and if information between the regulator and the industry is
asymmetric, it seems to be important to scrutinize proposed RJVs more closely. In the
USA there is some evidence that the current policy might actually encourage
undesirable RJVs to register under the NCRA while in Europe there is little control
over the RJVs that do form given the EEC block exemption of Article 85(1) of the EC
treaty for cooperative ventures in R&D.
This paper is closely related to the papers by Demski and Sappington (1984)
and Cremer and McLean (1988) which study optimal mechanism design by a principal
with multiple agents. Both papers find that when the information of the agents is
correlated and the agents are risk neutral, the first-best can be implemented. Our
approach differs from theirs in two ways. First, we analyze the effect of restricting the
policy instruments of the regulator. If no transfers are possible between the regulator
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Mechanism design in a regulatory context with more than one firm has been a fruitful new direction
in the regulation literature (Baron (1989), Anton and Yao (1989), Auriol and Laffont (1992), Demski
and Sappington (1984), McGuire and Riordan (1991), Olsen (1993), Wolinsky (1993)).8
and the agents, the regulator, by allowing or blocking the formation of a RJV, does not
posses enough degrees of freedom to implement the first-best. This is the case because
the policy regulates the conduct of both agents at the same time. Second, if transfers
are allowed, we assume that they are costly and cannot be negative. Implementing the
first-best mechanism of Demski and Sappington (1984) might be extremely costly. In
our model the regulator will trade off expected subsidy payments to the agents with
implementing the first-best policy. In order to implement the mechanism by Cremer and
McLean (1988), the regulator needs to impose large negative transfers on the agents
with small probability. This mechanism cannot be implemented because we feel it is
reasonable to assume that the regulatory agency responsible for implementing the R&D
policy usually cannot extract large payments from the firms.
Besanko and Spulber (1993) also analyze the effect of asymmetric information
between the regulator and the industry on the optimal merger policy, while restricting
the policy instruments of the regulator. There are two important distinctions between
their model and ours. First, their merger policy is not a revelation mechanism that
screens for the private information of the merging firm (its true ex-post marginal cost)
and second, the regulator is assumed not to be able to commit to a probability of
challenging the merger. In our model the regulator commits to a probability of
challenging the RJV and this probability is conditioned on the reports of the firms. In
line with our results, Besanko and Spulber (1993) find that due to asymmetric
information some welfare increasing mergers will not be consummated. However,
given the 2-dimensional state variable in our model, we also find that some welfare
reducing RJVs will be allowed depending on the beliefs of the regulator.
In the next section we set up the general model. In section three we solve the
model for the case where no subsidies are provided. Next we solve the general model
with lump-sum subsidies. Finally, we conclude by concentrating on policy
recommendations. In Appendix B we show that the model of d'Aspremont and9
Jacquemin (1988) is consistent with our more general model assumptions. Due to their
simple nature, proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2. The Model
Consider a duopoly where each firm invests in R&D. The model focuses on the
externality problem faced by these firms investing in R&D as represented by spillovers.
R&D investment spillovers can either be High (H) or Low (L). A high spillover for firm
i means that firm i absorbs a great deal of the knowledge of firm j. At the start of the
R&D project firms only know their own spillover and have beliefs about a rival's
spillover. The firms are symmetric except possibly for their spillover. The model, thus,
allows for the possibility of asymmetric spillovers where one firm has a high spillover
while the other has a low spillover. In industries with a dominant firm and a competitive
fringe, it is more likely that information flows from the dominant firm to the fringe. The
expected correlation between spillovers of these firms is negative. In other industries,
with partners of equal strength, spillovers are expected to be positively correlated. In
the R&D stage the firms can either compete in R&D or form a RJV. Forming a RJV
can be thought of as maximizing joint profits in the R&D stage. No efficiency gains in
R&D are assumed and no new entity is necessarily created by this agreement.
7
The government's objective is to maximize social welfare using a R&D policy
with two instruments: (1) allowing research joint ventures (RJVs) or not, and, (2)
giving lump sum subsidies to the firms. The government has a probability distribution
over the states of the world and there are four states of the world: S = {(L, L), (L, H),
(H, L), (H, H)}, i.e. both firms have low spillovers, one firm has a low spillover while
the other has a high spillover or both firms have high spillovers.
                                                       
7 Fusfeld and Haklish (1985) report that 1/3 of cooperative research is conducted at in-house facilities of
the cooperating entities. They also quote John Young, president of Hewlett-Packard on the value of
cooperative R&D: "it will enable US electronic companies to discuss and coordinate our research
objectives and to gain leverage on our expenditures". Firms thus contract on the amount of R&D they
will perform, which is consistent with our definition of a RJV. See also Audretsch (1989) and Odagiri
(1986) for similar examples of cooperative research in Japan.10
The timing of the game is as follows: the government commits to its R&D
policy after which the firms simultaneously submit claims about their spillover level.
The true state of the world is revealed to the firms after they filed their reports. They
subsequently make their R&D and output decisions with perfect information.
8, 
9
Let bi be the spillover level of firm i. The beliefs of the government and firms are given
by:
Government's Beliefs: Prob(b1=L, b2=L) = pLL,
Prob(b1=L, b2=H) = Prob(b1=H, b2=L) = pHL = pLH,
Prob(b1=H, b2=H) = pHH,
where pLL + 2pLH + pHH = 1.
Firm i's Beliefs:Prob(bj = L | bi = L) = pLL / (pLL + pLH),
Prob(bj = L | bi = H) = pLH / (pLH + pHH).
                                                       
8 The important assumption is that firms learn the true spillover levels before making their output
decisions and before any profits are realized. If the R&D project takes time to complete, it seems
reasonable that firms learn their rivals true spillover type before any major decisions need to be made
(R&D investments), but after any legal uncertainty about the RJV has been resolved.
9 This of course is only one of the possible games played. If the firms know the state of the world before
reporting, the government can obtain truthful revelation by having both firms report the state of the
world instead of only their own spillover. If the reports do not coincide, both firms are punished
severely. Alternatively the firms could only file one report. Without subsidies the regulator cannot do
better than simply allow or block a RJV based on its beliefs. With subsidies some screening is possible
when public funds are not too expensive. In the case that the firms do not learn the true state of the
world, the most general game would involve the whole communication game where the payoffs to the
players also depends on the reports made to the regulator: the regulator screens the firms while the
firms signal their types to each other through their reports. The firms will update their beliefs according
to the reports of their rival. This will complicate matters substantially because we cannot rely on the
revelation principle any more to solve this game. Truthful revelation is not necessarily an equilibrium of
this general game since the report of the firms serves as an announcement to both the government and
the firm's rival. Truthful revelation to the regulator implies at the same time truthful revelation to your
rival/partner which might not be optimal. See Baron and Besanko (1992) for a model where the
regulator chooses the organizational design of the suppliers such that they file a single report or
independent reports.12
are not allowed to form a RJV and W
c(bi, bj) the social welfare when firms form a RJV
in state (bi, bj). The following notation will prove useful:
wij = W
c(i, j) - W
nc(i, j) and vij = V
c(i, j) - V
nc(i, j), where i, j ˛ {L, H}.
In order to determine the first-best policy that maximizes welfare when the
regulator has symmetric information, we need to make some assumptions on the
welfare function.
12 In state (L, L) welfare is higher when the firms do not form a RJV
(wLL < 0 (A1)). If there are little or no appropriability problems, society is best served
by firms competing in R&D. Firms use R&D strategically to secure market share in the
output market. The RJV restricts R&D compared to the non-cooperative case, leading
to higher production costs and lower output which reduces welfare (Katz (1986)).
In the case of severe appropriability problems, total welfare is increased by the
formation of a RJV (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Katz and Ordover (1990)).
When competing in R&D, firms restrict their R&D expenditures since much of a firm's
research output flows to its rival. This externality is internalized by a RJV and as a
result society benefits because of increased R&D investments, lower production costs
and consequently a higher output at lower prices (wHH > 0 (A2)).
13
If the spillovers are different we assume that welfare is higher if both firms join
in a RJV (wLH = wHL > 0 (A3)).
14 The low spillover firm restricts its R&D investments
                                                                                                                                                       
funds it might lead to a perverse effect of taxing the firms to make money since the cost of funds now
adds to welfare.
12 In Appendix B it is shown that these assumptions are consistent with existing models of R&D
competition or cooperation with appropriability problems. Note that these assumptions also
accommodate the case where the regulator expects that firms that form a RJV collude in the output
market.
13 Note that because of the duopoly setup the RJV solves both the public good problem and the
externality caused by the spillover. If there are more than two firms in the industry, the regulator could
also use the maximal number of firms allowed into the RJV as a policy instrument. Tentative results
seem to suggest that under full information the regulator prefers no RJV in the case of low spillovers
and an industrywide RJV in the case of high spillovers. The firms, however, will always prefer some
intermediate size of the RJV (Greenlee and Cassiman (1996), De Bondt and Wu (1997), Poyago-
Theotoky (1995)).
14 When firms collude in the output market, this assumption is more likely to be violated. However,
with the reverse inequality qualitatively similar conclusions result.13
significantly more compared to the state where its rival also has a low spillover.
Forming a RJV restores the incentives of the low spillover firm to invest in R&D. The
increased knowledge flows freely to the high spillover firm. In response the high
spillover firm reduces its own R&D investments only slightly. Whenever the increase in
R&D investment of the low spillover firm outweighs the reduction of R&D by the high
spillover firm and total R&D investment increases, welfare is improved by the
formation of a RJV. The high spillover firm can maintain a competitive advantage in the
output market by not reducing its R&D investment by the same amount as the low
spillover firm increases its R&D in a RJV and thus capturing a larger market share in
the output market.
The firms always prefer to form a RJV (vij > 0 " i, j ˛{L, H} (A4)). A RJV
can coordinate the R&D investments of both firms such that total joint profits are
maximized. If we assume that transfers are allowed in the case of a RJV, the firms
prefer the RJV to competition in R&D.
15, 16
Given these assumptions, the first-best policy is to allow RJVs if at least one of
the firms has a high spillover. If both firms have a low spillover they will be required to
compete in R&D. If there is a cost of public funds, l, the regulator will not use any
subsidies since they are merely a costly transfer of funds. Every dollar spent by the
government, costs society 1 + l dollars.
When the spillover level of a firm is private information, the first-best policy is
not feasible. A conflict arises between the government’s objective and a firm’s objective
in the state (L, L). A low spillover firm has an incentive to claim that its spillover is
                                                       
15 We will not consider potential incentive problems between the partners of a RJV (see Veugelers and
Kesteloot (1994), and, Perez-Castrillo and Sandonis (1997)).
16 Note that the model does not specify the split of rents that result from the formation of the RJV
between the firms. If the division of rents is a function of the announced spillovers, this would create
additional strategic incentives in the announcement game (see also footnote 9). In the model we assume
that all uncertainty about the spillovers is resolved before investment and production. In that case the
true spillovers are know at the time the rents are realized and there is no opportunity for strategic
interaction between the firms with respect to the spillover announcement in order to capture a larger
share of the rents.15
In the no-subsidy case the only policy tool in the hands of the government is the
probability with which to allow a RJV. This simplifies the problem that the government
has to solve considerably. Suppose that an unsophisticated government ignores the
private information of the firms and only allows or prohibits the RJV based on its own
beliefs. This leads to the following policy: the regulator allows RJVs when the marginal
probability of the low spillover type, q, is low. Most likely RJVs are welfare improving
in this region. As the marginal probability of the low spillover type increases, there is a
point (U(pLL, pHH) = 0)
 17 at which the R&D policy changes to not allowing any RJVs.
The government can improve upon this policy by using firm-reports about their
spillovers. However, the Incentive Constraints come in to play. The following
propositions summarize the second-best R&D policy. The intuition of the optimal
second-best mechanism can be best understood by considering the different regions in
(r, q)-space depicted in Figure 1. The full statement of Proposition 1 and 2 and its
proof can be found in Appendix A.
Let f
SB = [rLL, rLH, rHH] define the optimal second-best R&D policy and let
U(pLL, pHH) = pLL wLL + 2 pLH wLH + pHHwHH. The second-best R&D policy can either
be a screening policy which separates the states of the world or a pooling policy.
                                                       
17 Let U(pLL, pHH) = pLL wLL + 2 pLH wLH + pHHwHH. If U(pLL, pHH) ‡ 0, the government will always allow
RJVs, while if U(pLL, pHH) < 0, no RJV will be allowed.16
Proposition 1:
The regulator selects a pooling policy,
1. if the state (L, L) is very unlikely (R(1)). RJVs are always allowed: f
SB = [1, 1, 1],
2. if the state (L, L) is very likely (R(2)). No RJVs are allowed: f
SB = [0, 0, 0],
3.  if the high spillover firm is tempted to lie about its true type under the mechanism
that induces truthful revelation by a low spillover type. RJVs are always allowed or
never allowed, depending on the regulator's beliefs (IH(i)):
f
SB = [0, 0, 0] if U(pLL, pHH) £ 0,
f
SB = [1, 1, 1] if U(pLL, pHH) ‡ 0.
The regulator chooses a separating R&D policy whenever it is welfare increasing to








= . The regulator selects a screening policy,
1. if the states (L, L) and (H, H) are more likely (R(3)): f
SB = [q , 0, 1]  if  q £ 1.
2. if the state (L, H) or (H, L) is very likely (R(4)-R(5)):
f




]  if q ‡ 1,
f
SB = [ 1- q, 1, 0]  if q £ 1.
The second-best mechanism depends critically on the beliefs of the regulator
and the firms. The probability of allowing a RJV changes as the underlying beliefs of
the government and the firms change.
18 The following comparative statics results w.r.t.
r and q will help to clarify the intuition of the second-best R&D policy:
                                                       
18 Note that the regulator is only indifferent between a screening or a pooling R&D policy on the border
between the regions where the optimal policy switches from a pooling policy to a screening policy.18
region R(2) no RJVs are allowed. If q is high, the state (L, L) will be very likely while
the occurrence of (H, H), (L, H) or (H, L) is negligible.
In region R(3) there exists positive correlation between the types and most
probability weight lies on states (L, L) and (H, H). The high types will be allowed to
form a RJV while the low types will only get to form a RJV with probability q. The
firms are punished if the reports are (L, H) or (H, L) where the punishment consists of
not allowing them to form a RJV.
19 A low spillover firm refrains from lying because the
probability that its rival is also a low spillover firm is high. As the correlation between
the types increases, the second-best policy converges to the first-best since the
probability of forming a RJV in the state (L, L), sufficient to induce truthful revelation,
goes to zero. Under perfect correlation, given that its rival reveals truthfully, a low
spillover firm is indifferent between telling the truth or not. Whatever its report, the
firms are not allowed to form a RJV.
The last two regions, R(4) and R(5), involve negative correlation between the
types. The probability pLH, that the firms have different spillovers, is considered very
high in both of these cases. A RJV is thus allowed if the firms announce (L, H) or (H,
L). In region R(5) the regulator has to worry about the low-spillover firm lying, while
the probability of (H, H) is still relatively high. If the low spillover firm lies, the likely
report is (H, H). The probability with which the firms are allowed to form a RJV in this
case decreases with a higher marginal probability of the low type which deters the low
spillover firm from lying given that the probability of the true state (L, L) increases. On
the boundary of region R(5) and R(4) the threat of a low firm lying has become so large
(as q increases) that the regulator must allow a positive probability of forming a RJV
when the state is (L, L) to keep a low spillover firm truthful. The probability 1-q of
allowing a RJV in state (L, L) increases from zero on the boundary with R(5) up to the
                                                       
19 Not allowing a RJV when reporting (L, H) or (H, L) is the harshest punishment the regulator can
give since we do not allow any transfers between the government and the firms. Even in the case of
subsidies, we purposely restrict them to be non-negative.20
spillovers are more likely to be high relative to more traditional sectors. So we should
expect regulators to be more lenient with respect to RJVs in high technology than in
more traditional sectors. Second, if the optimal R&D policy screens for the state (L, L),
the regulator should solicit information about the RJV and the individual firms, in
particular about the involuntary spillover that these firms expect to realize, whether
they compete in R&D or form a RJV. Firms that announce having high spillovers
should argue their case, f.i. through referring to their organizational learning capabilities
in other R&D projects or to other mechanisms that allow them to absorb information
more readily. Through its R&D policy the regulator needs to commit to allow some of
the RJVs when they are not efficient in order to minimize information manipulation by
the firms. The case of self-selection of low spillover firms that have registered under the
NCRA illustrates this potential for information manipulation by the firms and the
industry and should put regulators on alert with respect to uncritically approving RJVs.
This, however, points to one potential problem with the implementation of the
proposed mechanism in the case of a screening policy: the government needs to be able
to credibly commit to the mechanism. Ex post renegotiation needs to be avoided. In
addition, the firms applying to form a RJV have an incentive to try to manipulate the
decision of the regulator through lobbying or bribes. These problems are not specific to
this regulatory situation and policy makers have dealt with these issues through clear
guidelines and monitoring.
22
An alternative application of the model is a situation where two suppliers of a
firm or two government contractors want to form an alliance to design components and
deal with their common customer as a single decision maker. Jointly designing
components might generate efficiencies for both suppliers. Part of these benefits will
flow to the customer, but the customer worries about the final price that the suppliers
will charge for the components. In the case that the final price cannot be specified ex
ante, the customer might lose some of its ex-post bargaining power vis-à-vis its
                                                       
22 See Besanko and Spulber (1993) where the merger guidelines are optimally adjusted to take into22
best R&D policy f
FB = [0, 1, 1] can be implemented with an expected subsidy of pLLvLL
to the low spillover firm.
23 However, as the following proposition states, the second-








= and S = pLLSLL + pLHSLH. The second-best R&D policy with subsidies
is characterized as follows:
1.  If the state (L, L) is not very likely (Rl(1)): the first-best R&D policy
f
FB = [0, 1, 1] is implemented with S = pLLvLL,
2. If the state (L, L) is very likely (Rl(2)): f
SB = [0, 0, 0] and S = 0,
3.  If the state (L, L) and (H, H) are more likely (Rl(3)):
f
SB = [0, 0, 1] and S = pLHvLH,
4. If the state (L, H) or (H, L) is very likely (Rl(4) or Rl(5)):
f
SB = [0, 1, 0] and S = pLLvLL - pLHvLH, if q £ 1,
f




] and S = 0, if q ‡ 1.
Proof:  see Appendix A.
Figure 2 shows the relevant regions. To clarify the relation with the no-subsidy
case, the original regions of the no-subsidy case are depicted in dotted lines. As public
funds become more costly, the second-best R&D policy with subsidies converges to
the no-subsidy case.
[Figure 2]
                                                       
23 We need to check that the incentive compatibility constraint of the High spillover type is not violated.
See Appendix A for conditions for which this is the case.23
In region Rl(1) the first-best policy is implemented. However, because public
funds are costly, the first-best welfare level is not attained. The expected subsidy to a
firm with a low spillover is equal to the gain in profit from forming a RJV in the state
(L, L). Note also that the region of beliefs, Rl(1), in which this mechanism is sustained,
contains the region for which the government always allowed RJVs in the no-subsidy
case, i.e. region R(1). Given that the R&D policy consists of both a probability of
allowing the RJV and lump-sum subsidies, the regulator can implement the first-best
through a dominant strategy for one of the firms as in Demski and Sappington (1984) if
vLL < vHL. In Demski and Sappington (1984) this assumption is satisfied by an
assumption on the marginal productivity of the agent. However this assumption need
not be satisfied here. In addition there is no cost of funds associated with the transfer of
funds to the agent in their model. Implementing the first-best in dominant strategies in
our model might be very costly in welfare terms depending on the cost of funds which
implies that the second-best mechanism differs from the first-best one.
24 Cremer and
McLean (1988) construct a mechanism in Bayesian strategies which achieves the first-
best whenever there is some correlation between the types of the agents. This
mechanism can only be implemented through negative transfers from the regulator to
the firms. As correlation between the types goes to zero, these payments by the agents
go to infinity, creating a discontinuity at zero correlation (Laffont and Martimort
(1997)). We avoid this mechanism by restricting attention to non-negative transfers. As
argued before, this seems more reasonable in the case of R&D policy (footnote 11).
The region for which no RJVs are allowed in any state, region Rl(2), is a subset
of that region, R(2), in the no-subsidy case. In the no-subsidy case it was inefficient not
to allow RJVs if the true states where (L, H), (H, L) and (H, H) in this region.
Subsidies increase the power of the R&D policy. The trade off between subsidies and a
more efficient R&D organization is positive for a subset of R(2) in the no-subsidy case.
                                                       
24 If l = 0, the first-best is always implemented as Rl(1) is the only non-empty region.24
In region Rl(3) the regulator reduces the expected subsidies (rents) to the low
spillover types compared to the expected subsidies in region Rl(1). Allowing a RJV
only in state (H, H) and not in the asymmetric states accomplishes this. The asymmetric
states, (L, H) or (H, L) are so unlikely that this trade off is profitable in expected
welfare terms. The subsidies will be set at the maximum in the state (L, H) or (H, L)
(see proof Lemma 4). This keeps the low types honest because of the expected reward.
Note that as the correlation of types increases the subsidy converges to zero and the
second-best R&D policy converges to the first-best.
In regions Rl(4) and Rl(5), the asymmetric states are extremely likely. A RJV
will always be allowed if the firms report (L, H) or (H, L). If q is low, the regulator
would like to tax the firms in order to implement the first-best policy. Given that this is
not an option for the regulator, the second-best R&D policy reduces the probability of
approving a RJV when the firms announce (H, H). However if the marginal probability
of being low (q) becomes too high, the regulator will revert to subsidies to keep the
low spillover firms truthful. This transition is continuous. As in the no-subsidy case, q
decreases to 1 at the boundary with Rl(4) after which subsidies take over the role of q in
the no-subsidy case. Subsidies are now a more cost efficient means to create separation
in region Rl(4).
The second-best R&D policy with lump-sum subsidies reveals that in addition
to the policy being industry specific and the need for soliciting private information
about the appropriability conditions of the industry, the regulator should be prepared to
subsidize low spillover firms if public funds are not too costly. Instead of being too
lenient towards the formation of RJVs, the regulator should reward low spillover firms
for providing accurate information about the state of the industry which allows the
regulator to better judge the welfare effects of the proposed RJVs. In a more general
framework these lump-sum subsidies could be part of a R&D subsidy policy that would
also improve the incentives of a low spillover firm to invest in R&D. By this mechanism
the low spillover firms are then rewarded for the provision of a public good.25
5. Conclusions
Knowledge resulting from R&D investments is characterized by both an
externality and a public good problem. By implementing a R&D policy that encourages
cooperative R&D in industries with severe appropriability problems, the government
increases social welfare. However, the extent to which appropriability problems exist in
a specific industry, is usually private information. Hence, the government should set up
its R&D policy taking this information problem into account.
The government and the firms have conflicting objectives whenever both firms
have low spillovers. The optimal R&D policy screens for the state (L, L) except when
either the state (L, L) or the state (H, H) is extremely likely, or, when high and low
spillover firms can not simultaneously be induced to reveal their type truthfully. In the
no-subsidy case the probability of allowing a RJV is such that a low spillover firm has
no incentive to lie about its spillover in order to be allowed to form a RJV. If public
funds are not too costly, lump-sum subsidies are a more efficient means to screen out
the state (L, L). The expected subsidy compensates the low spillover firm for revealing
truthfully. However, these lump-sum subsidies will not improve allocative efficiency of
R&D at the margin. They only improve the screening capability of the government.
Examining a two-part subsidy scheme with a fixed transfer and a per unit R&D subsidy
is left for future research. The per unit R&D subsidies improve total welfare both in the
case of R&D cooperation and competition. But we still expect to find similar
distortions of the first-best R&D policy as in the case of lump-sum subsidies analyzed
here.
The fact that rival firms can have different spillovers in the same industry,
however small the probability, results in a non trivial R&D policy. The first-best policy
cannot be implemented anymore. Any rational firm will claim to have a high spillover
level in the hope to be allowed to form a RJV. In reality the types of the firms will most
likely be positively correlated (0 < r < 1) within a given industry. Unlike an
unsophisticated R&D policy where the regulator only allows RJVs or not based on its26
beliefs about the state of the industry, the second-best R&D policy uses the fact that the
spillovers of the firms are correlated in its formulation. If the marginal probability of the
low spillover type, q, is low, RJVs should always be allowed because the state (H, H) is
very likely. With a high marginal probability of the low spillover type, RJVs should not
be allowed. As the correlation between the types increases, the regulator can use this
correlation to improve upon the unsophisticated R&D policy by punishing asymmetric
state reports by the firms. A low spillover firm will then refrain from lying. A carefully
structured lump-sum subsidy program gets the second-best R&D policy even closer to
the first-best.
The second-best R&D policy derived in this paper differs from the current
R&D policy with respect to RJVs in both the US and Europe. We find that the
regulator should worry more about the effects of asymmetric information between
himself and the industry. What really drives the case for allowing RJVs is the existence
of technological spillovers. The regulator can improve upon the existing R&D policy of
basically not challenging any RJV, by relying on its beliefs about the spillover state of
the industry or, in some cases, screening for the true spillover state. Thus increasing
scrutiny over RJV formation should increase welfare.
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of STEP 1 determine the second-best policy.¤
Appendix B
In this Appendix we show that all assumptions made in the general model are
satisfied in a simple, but often used model of R&D investment with spillovers. We
focus on the cost reducing investment game proposed by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988). The game firms play is a two stage game. In the first stage they make R&D
investment decisions to reduce their marginal costs of production in the second stage.
In the second stage firms compete in quantities in the output market. Spillovers through
which knowledge (part of the firms investment) is also acquired by the rival firm, occur
in the first stage. After the first stage firms observe each others R&D levels.
26 Let xi be
firm i's first stage R&D investment and qi its second stage market output. Let MCi be
firm i's marginal cost of production: MCi = c - xi - bixj where bi=L=0 or bi=H=1. Firms
products are homogeneous with demand, p = a - Q, where Q = q1 + q2 and a>c.
We now append a stage to the game before the firms make any decisions. In
this stage the regulator sets up the mechanism where it allows RJVs or not depending
on the firms reports and can give a lump sum subsidy. Profits and welfare will depend
on the institutional mechanism set up by the regulator. To simplify notation we will
index all functions by nc when firms act non-cooperatively in both stages and c when a
RJV is formed.
27
To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the game backwards.  Firms
always act non-cooperatively (Nash-Cournot) in the output market (suppose this is
enforced by antitrust legislation). We can solve for the output levels as a function of
R&D investment levels in the first stage:
qi(xi,xj; bi, bj) = Z + Aixi + Bixj, where Z = (a-c)/3, Ai = (2-bj)/3 and Bi = (2bi-1)/3.
note that Ai > 0 " bi and Bi < 0 if bi=0, Bi > 0 if bi=1.
In the previous stage firms decide on R&D investment. Note that we assumed
that at the time that the firms make their R&D and output decisions they have perfect
information about the state of nature. The regulator can influence this decision by its
R&D policy schedule that is set up in a stage before the firms play their two stage
game.
Reduced form profits as a function of R&D investments are:
Vi
k(xi,xj; bi, bj) = [qi(xi,xj; bi, bj)]
2 - (G/2)(xi)
2 where xi = xi
k(bi, bj) and k = nc or c,
                                                       
26 This assumption is to allow for strategic interactions w.r.t. R&D (De Bondt and Veugelers (1991)).
27 Forming a RJV in this model stands for maximizing joint profits in the R&D stage. No efficiency
gains in R&D are assumed. No new entity is necessarily created by this agreement. See also footnote 7.35
where (G/2)(xi)
2 is the cost function for R&D investments accounting for decreasing
returns to scale in R&D. G is an efficiency parameter: the lower G, the more efficient
the firm in its R&D investments.
The equilibrium R&D levels for the different cases are:
Firms compete in R&D:
xi
nc(bi, bj) = [2ZAi(G-2Aj
2+2AjBi)]/N, where N = (G-2Ai
2)(G-2Aj
2)-(2AiBi)(2AjBj).
Firms form a RJV:
xi
c(bi, bj) = 2Z[(Aj+Bi)(2A1B1+ 2A2B2) + (Ai+Bj)(G-2Ai
2-2Bj
2)]/M,






We assume that all output levels are non negative, the second order conditions
are satisfied as well as the stability conditions on the problem (Seade (1980), Henriques
(1990), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1990), De Bondt and Henriques (1992), De
Bondt, Slaets and Cassiman (1992)). Basically this will put lower bounds on the R&D
efficiency parameter G: G must be "sufficiently" large. From these conditions we derive
that G >G = 4/3.
28
The welfare function (consumer (CS




k(bi, bj) = (q1+q2)
2/2 + (q1
2+q2
2) - G/ 2 (x1
2+x2
2) where k = nc or c.
Now we are able to calculate the reduced form profit and welfare functions
gross of subsidies for all states for all possible government R&D policies under perfect
information. These are the objects we care about in the paper.
nc W (L,L) =   4(a-c 2 )  
9 -4
nc W (L,H) =   2(a-c 2 ) (162 3-261 2+132 -16)
(9 -4 2 ) (3 -2 2 )
nc W (H,H) =   4(a-c 2 ) (9 -1)
(9 - 4 2 )
G
G




c W (L,L) =   4(a-c 2 ) (9 -1)
(9 -2 2 )
c W (L,H) =   2(a-c 2 ) ( -1)(18 2-23 +4)
(9 2-14 +4 2 )
c W (H,H) =   4(a-c 2 ) (9 -4)
(9 -8 2 )
G G
G




                                                       
28 The exact conditions and calculations for this section are available upon request.36
nc V (L,L) =   (a-c 2 ) (9 -8)
(9 -4 2 )
nc V (L,H) =   (a-c 2 ) (3 -4 2 ) (9 - 2)
(9 -4 2 ) (3 - 2 2 )
nc V (H,L) =   9(a-c 2 ) (9 -8) 3
(9 -4 2 ) (3 -2 2 )
nc V (H,H) =   (a-c 2 ) (9 -2)









c V (L,L) =   (a-c 2 )
9 -2
c V (L,H) =   (a-c 2 ) ( - 2)
9 2-14 +4
c V (H,L) =   (a-c 2 ) 2
9 2-14 +4










Proposition (B1): There exists a G* such that for all G > max{G*,G} the
assumptions (A1)-(A4) are satisfied in this model.
Proof: Note that all reduced form profit and welfare functions are a function of G
and (a-c)
2 and are separable in these terms. To check the assumptions it is
sufficient to check the largest root G
(i) of these expressions and check the
sign of these expressions for larger G: (A1) - (A3) hold for all G >G
If transfers are allowed in the RJV, (A4) holds for all G >G, since we
assume that the firms forming a RJV will maximize joint profits. If no
transfers are allowed, we could also focus on a particular split of the joint
profits namely the one where no transfers are involved, each firm gets the
profits according to its production when individual R&D levels are chosen
to maximize joint profits. Again we can derive the conditions on G for (A4)
to hold:
in states (L, L), (H, L) and (H, H), (A4) holds if G > G.
in state (L, H), (A4) holds if G > max{3.36, G}= 3.36.
Let G* = G = 4/9 in the general case or let G* = 3.36 in the specific RJV
profit sharing case.¤
Proposition (B2): For all G > G the assumptions (A5)-(A8') are satisfied in this
model.
Proof: (A5) holds for all G > max{1.06, G}= G
(A6) and (A7) hold for all G > max{0.84, G}= G
(A8) holds for all G > max{1.15, G }= G
(A8') holds for all G > max{1.08, G}= G ¤
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